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Pension reform is a major policy initiative  offered by governments  to aging populations  fed up
by failing old-age  security  arrangements. The spreading  of pension  reform around the globe is occurring
at a growing  speed. It ranges from Latin America  (Chile 1981,  Mexico 1991,  Peru 1993, Argentina  1994
and Colombia 1994)  to OECD countries  (Switzerland  1985, Australia 1992),  with current discussions  of
major reform projects in most other Latin American countries, some OECD economies, and many
developing  countries  in Asia and Eastern Europe. The next few years will witness an exponential  growth
of pension reform. A conservative  estimate  is that 30 major country-wide  pension reforms will have  been
started by the year 2000.
These pension reform  programs  --  although initiated in a  large variety of countries  --  have
common  ingredients. The new brand of mandatory  pension  proposals  typically comprises  two elements:
a pillar of fully-funded  saving based on individual  pension accounts, with investments  channeled  to a
variety of public and private long-term  instruments  often selected  and managed  by the private sector, and
a complementary  state-run distributive  pillar in support of the old-age poor.  They involve a radical
departure from the still dominating  conventional  pension paradigm in three dimensions: (i) substitution
of a pay-as-you-go  scheme by a fully-funded  arrangement  for (at least part) of old-age saving, (ii) more
explicit separation  of the distributive  component from the non-distributive  pillar, and (iii) (frequently)
private management  of collection of contributions, investment  of pension fund savings, and/or payment
of pension benefits.
Mandatory  old-age security systems are indeed among  the most multi-dimensional  and complex
economic  arrangements  developed  by modern  societies. They involve  macroeconomic  and welfare  issues
resulting  from how  they affect saving and output  by inducing  intergenerational  transfers, capital and labor
market distortions, and public finance effects ranging from tax efficiency questions  to deficit financing
issues. Pension  systems  also affect intragenerational  equity and old-age  poverty --  in ways which often
differ from those intended  by the systems' stated distributive  objectives. They also impinge on the role2
of the private sector, the functioning of capital and insurance markets, and the need for government
regulation  and insurance. Finally, the political economy of pension systems and reforms is a complex
outcome of actions by many interest groups, such as worker and employer organizations.  pensioners,
public pension institutions,  private pension funds, and the government. It is hard to think of economic
arrangements  other than pension systems that involve simultaneously  so many markets and people and
such large financial resource flows.
This paper surveys current research issues and country experiences  related to old-age security
arrangements  by introducing  the papers refereed and selected for a special issue of Revista de Analisis
Econ6mico  (vol. 9, No. 1, June 1994) and the July 1994  Conference on Pension Systems sponsored  by
Fundacao  Getuilio  Vargas in Rio de Janeiro.  In a policy field characterized  by exponentially  growing
country  experiences  it should not surprise that many  more analytical  and policy questions  are raised than
answers  are provided  by researchers --  let alone  agreements  reached on many  contentious  issues. Hence
we also pose in this paper some of the remaining  research questions --  those which we face more often
in policy discussions  or think are addressed in a least satisfactory  way by the literature known to us.
Section 2 reviews the papers.  Section 3 poses questions  for future research.  The conclusions
are left to the reader.
2.  ANSWERS  TO OPEN OUESTIONS  AND REVIEWS  OF COUNTRY  EXPERIENCES
2.1  Macroeconomics  and Intergenerational  Welfare'
The seminal contributions  by Samuelson  (1958) and Diamond (1965) have introduced the two-
cohort overlapping-generations  (OLG) model to analyze the main public finance, accumulation, and
intergenerational  welfare dimensions  of public  debt and old-age  security  arrangements. A major extension
I Arrau  and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1993),  Felderer  (1993)  and Corsetti  and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1995) survey  the
theoretical  and empirical  literature  on macroeconomic  and  intergenerational  welfare  effects  of pension  systems  and
reforms.3
of Diamond's  (1965) two-cohort  OLG model is Auerbach  and Kotlikoff's  (1987) many-generations  OLG
dynamic model, which provides a realistic number of interacting cohorts and has been successfully
applied  to analyze issues ranging  from pension systems  to taxation. It is particularly useful in showing
the impact,  transition and steady-state  effects of mandatory  pension systems  and reforms.  Applications
of the Diamond-Auerbach-Kotlikoff  (DAK)  framework  to Mexico  (Arrau 1990),  Chile (Arrau 1991),  and
representative  economies  (Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel  1993) have been used to assess the dynamic and
macroeconomic  effects of pension reforms involving  substitution  of PAYG  systems  by FF schemes  based
on individual accounts.
Additional  results on intergenerational-transfer  and Pareto-efficiency  aspects  of pension systems
and reforms  have  been obtained  during the last decade. Substituting  fully-funded  (FF) systems  for pay-as-
you-go  (PAYG)  schemes implies a transfer toward future generations  when part of the transition deficit
is financed  by taxation  on intermediate  tax-paying  cohorts --  a transfer  which is only avoided  when new
explicit government debt is issued (or other government assets like public enterprises are sold) to
substitute  for the initial and implicit PAYG debt.  Tax-financed  transfers toward future generations --
like any other contractionary  fiscal policy in a world of incomplete  bequests --  raise saving and welfare
levels of future cohorts and, in a closed economy, increase capital and output levels.  If both general
taxation  and PAYG contributions  are not distortionary, Pareto-efficiency  is not affected by the reform
(Breyer 1989). The more realistic  case is when both forms of taxation  are distortionary. Then a PAYG-
FF reform raises Pareto-efficiency  by eliminating  the pure-tax component of PAYG contributions  but
reduces Pareto-efficiency  by increasing  general taxation to pay for a tax-financed  transition or for the
interest payments  on the higher explicit  government  debt. 2 Hence  a pension reform has at least in theory
2 On  the  relative  efficiency  of income  taxation  (which  is the  general  tax  considered  by the  simulations  discussed
in this  paper  below),  Auerbach,  Kotlikoff  and  Skinner  (1983)  conclude  from  second-best  theory  that  income  taxation
will  not  always  be more  efficient  than  wage  or payroll  taxation;  "rather,  the  relative  efficiency  of the two  taxes  will
depend  on  the  particular  structure  of preferences"  (Auerbach  and Kotlikoff,  1987,  p. 80). Auerbach  and  Kotlikoff's
(1987,  Table  5.7, p. 77)  simulation  results  for a switch  from  income  to wage  taxation  in the U.S. show  efficiency4
ambiguous  Pareto-efficiency  effects. If PAYG  contributions  are more distortionary  than general taxation,
the Pareto-efficiency  gain of a reform allows to completely  repay the new explicit government  debt in
finite time (Homburg 1990).
Most of the literature until 1990 has focused on the simple OLG model for the polar cases of
closed or small-open  economies, and in the absence of voluntary intergenerational  transfers (including
bequests), myopia, credit constraints, and uncertainty.  These assumptions have been lifted by the
following  work, which has broken new ground recently.
The effects of introducing  PAYG  in the intermediate  case of a large open economy, which affects
international  interest rates, may be very different from those obtained in the polar cases of closed or
small-open  economies. Breyer  and Wildasin  (1993) show  that starting PAYG  implies  an additional  terms-
of-trade gain (loss) when the economy is a net creditor (debtor) of the rest of the world, derived from
an increase  in international  interest  rates. In a multi-country  setting  with free migration,  government  debt
and  pension systems  --  relevant  for  the  European  Union  --  national  PAYG  schemes that  are not
harmonized  across countries result in inefficient international  allocation of resources (Homburg and
Richter 1993).
When  some people are more myopic (have  higher discount  rates)  than others within their cohorts
and also face credit constraints, introducing  a mandatory FF system forces them to save involuntarily,
raising long-term  capital and output but lowering private welfare levels in a closed economy. Valdes-
Prieto  and Cifuentes  (1993) and Cifuentes  and Valdes-Prieto  (1994) show  that under these conditions  the
potential  effects of a PAYG-FF reform are magnified.
Even when people are uncertain  with regard to the cohort they belong  to (and hence with regard
to their level  of future  taxation), PAYG  is not welfare improving  along  most growth  paths (Richter 1993).
losses  for  six and  efficiency  gains  for  one of their  parameter  combinations.  This  could  suggest  that  efficiency  gains
are more  likely  than  efficiency  losses  when  substituting  payroll  by income  taxation  in real economies.5
But when PAYG is able to spread productivity  risk across cohorts it can raise  welfare (Enders and Lapan
1993).  The opposite result holds when PAYG implies larger political uncertainty affecting PAYG
benefits than the financial uncertainty on FF returns: then a reform can be Pareto-welfare  improving
(Valdes-Prieto  1994d).
In sum, the DAK model  for life-cycle  saving and mandatory  pension regimes  has been extremely
successful  in teaching  economists  and policy makers  the stylized  features,  dynamics,  and intergenerational
equity  trade-offs  of old-age  security  arrangements. For instance it helps dispel  the wide-spread  but wrong
notion  --  held by over-enthusiastic pension reformers  time and again  --  that substituting PAYG by FF
raises future saving and output levels even in the absence of intergenerational  transfers and efficiency
gains.  It also contributes  to dispel the incorrect idea --  often held by opponents  to pension reform --
that pension reform transition deficits contribute to  public sector insolvency and  macroeconomic
instability, even when public debt instruments are available and used for substituting the old implicit
PAYG  debt by new explicit government  debt in a market where fiscal illusion is ahsent.
Cifuentes  (1994) uses Arrau's (1991) dynamic simulation  model  to address an issue that inspires
many pension reforms.  The financial collapse of many PAYG systems. due to growing benefits and
rising dependency  ratios, has led policy  makers  to propose  higher retirement  ages as a solution  to growing
pension  system deficits. Chile, Germany. Italy and Japan have increased  retirement ages to 65 years and
the United States has raised it to 67 years.  Cifuentes simulates an increase in retirement age and
estimates  the welfare effect for every cohort during the transition period and the new steady state.  He
finds that the welfare impact on those cohorts which are close to retirement age can be substantial,
reaching between 10 and 15% of their welfare (wealth-equivalent)  levels. This result points toward the
need  to be careful  when raising  retirement ages in order to minimize  disproportionately  high welfare costs
paid by reform-transition  cohorts.
Most  research on social  security  has been conducted  in the framework  of one-sector  OLG models6
with exogenous long-term growth, where pension reform can only involve level effects on output and
welfare but not impinge  on stationary growth rates.  Can social security reform affect output growth in
the context of a two-sector  economy  with endogenous  growth? 3
This question  is addressed  by Corsetti (1994). He develops  an endogenous  growth model for a
two-sector economy, where the difference between the formal and informal sectors is that the former
complies with social security legislation and hence pays pension contributions.  Using an  "AK"
technology  where capital has an external effect on labor productivity and is the ultimate productive
resource, Corsetti assesses the magnitude  of labor market distortions  associated with different pension
regimes  and analyzes  conditions  under which a PAYG-FF reform raises the rate of capital accumulation
and output growth allowing for reform-induced  changes in the structure of production.  In general,
because  of conflicting  income  and substitution  effects, the change in consumption  and growth cannot be
determined  unambiguously. However, illustrative  simulations  suggest that the long-run positive effect
of a PAYG-FF  pension reform on growth may be sizeable. The dominant  cause of the growth increase
stems from the incentive  to shift labor toward the formal sector, while possible intergenerational  transfer
effects due to a tax-financed  transition are secondary.
2.2  Income  distribution. Poverty and the Role of Government
Reducing  poverty  at a rate exceeding  output  growth should  be a policy objective  in every society.
Public  policy should aim to reach this goal at the lowest  possible efficiency  cost.  Solidarity and income
redistribution  have  been raised as central objectives  by advocates  of PAYG  systems  devised  for providing
both retirement income (and other social benefits) and income redistribution  toward the old-age poor.
3 The  recent  endogenous-growth  literature  is providing  underpinnings  for  the notion  that  changes  in capital  and
labor market  efficiency  have permanent  effects  on growth  rates (St. Paul 1992). Recent  work on two-sector
(formal-informal)  models  with endogenous  growth suggest  that sectoral shifts  are important  (Loayza 1993).
Therefore  the  question  arises  about  the growth  effects  of a PAYG-FF  pension  reform  which  reduces  distortions  in
formal  labor  markets,  promoting  a shift  of employment  and production  from infornal  to formal  markets.7
However, defined-benefit  PAYG pensions are typically  not income tested and PAYG resource transfers
often redistribute  income among contributors and beneficiaries in ways which do not benefit the truly
needy but  serve  interest  groups  successful in  lobbying legislatures and  state  pension  system
administrations.
Valdes-Prieto  (1994b)  provides an innovative  review  of the rationale of using the pension  system
as a tool for redistribution. He compares  the pros and cons of the redistributive  objective  of a universal
PAYG  system with its main competitor, a targeted program  benefitting  the old-age poor.  He argues that
the latter approach  should be adopted  by pension reform proposals in developing  countries. Substituting
PAYG  by FF requires replacing  the distributive  function implicit in the PAYG system --  the political
feasibility  of such a reform often depends on finding  an effective  redistributive  substitute. Valdes-Prieto
also performs steady-state  simulations  based on the DAK framework, concluding  that substitution  of a
redistributive  PAYG  scheme by a non-redistributive  FF system (even without  putting in place a separate
minimum-pension  pillar financed by general taxation)  can raise income  and welfare levels of the poor in
the long run when part of the transition deficit is tax-financed.  For the transition period a support
program for the poor is needed, for which the paper recommends  a targeted transfer and shows that this
program  can be financed  with public debt without  jeopardizing the long run gains.
One of the main distributive  instruments  available to the government for targeting the old-age
poor is the guarantee of a minimum pension to all contributors to the pension system.  In a PAYG
system, the government can raise contributions paid by all currently active workers when current
contribution levels are insufficient  to  finance minimum-pension  benefits.  In a defined-contribution
individual-capitalization  system the government must resort to  general tax revenue to pay for this
program. In the latter case the government  bears the risk of workers ending up with insufficient  funds
to cover a minimum-pension  equivalent at the end of their active lives.  Therefore the contingent
minimum-pension  liability of the govermment  depends on the riskiness of the assets in which pension8
funds are invested. We know little about the value of this contingent  liability or even how to approach
this issue analytically. The government  liability  depends on several variables, including  the level of the
minimum  pension, the rate of contribution,  the administrative  costs of the system, and the riskiness of
the assets in which the funds are invested, etc.  The latter is perhaps the most difficult aspect to assess
and the one that requires most sophisticated  modelling.
Zurita (1994) takes a very important first step to  address this issue for the  case of Chile.
Previous work on the estimation of the minimum pension liability has been based on deterministic
methods  (Wagner 1991)  and therefore ignores risk.  Zurita estimates  the riskiness (volatility)  of pension
fund assets and uses this information  in a continuous-time  option-based  model in order to compute the
insurance  cost to the government. He uses numerical  model solutions  to derive this cost by gender, age,
and income levels.  Aggregation  of all costs by groups allows to obtain a total cost estimate of 3% of
GDP.  This figure is considerably higher than the previous estimates  based on deterministic  methods,
which stresses  the need to incorporate  the risk factor.  Zurita's approach  will certainly  encourage  further
work in this important  area.
2.3  Social Insurance  Policy. Private Pension Systems, and Public Pension Funds
Social insurance policy  --  encompassing pension,  health and social welfare  programs  --  is a
central component  of government  action but seldom  subject to close scrutiny based on first principles.
Kotlikoff  (1994) lays out a framework  for evaluating  social insurance policies enacted by governments
and supported by  multilateral financial institutions.  He proposes that intra and  intergenerational
accounting,  complemented  by consideration  of effective  marginal tax rates facing different households,
should  be the main  tool to evaluate  sustainability,  incentive  effects, and intra/intergenerational  distribution9
effects  of fiscal policy in general and social insurance  arrangements  in particular. 4 Then he analyzes  the
rationale  for government  risk pooling to be provided in addition to the insurance  acquired privately by
households.  Here the focus is on potential market imperfections and the need to  conduct careful
household studies to  assess the effectiveness of  private risk  sharing and  hence the rationale for
complementary  government insurance policy.  Finally Kotlikoff  analyzes the U.S. as a basket case of
inefficient  social insurance  policy in OECD countries, concluding  that U.S. PAYG  social insurance  has
three main perverse  effects: the PAYG transfer to the elderly that accounts --  in combination  with the
modality  of pension annuity payments --  for most of the decline in national saving; excessively  high
effective  marginal labor income taxation  that provides strong disincentives  to work in the formal sector,
and intragenerational  redistribution  that occurs in capricious  ways.
Private pension  systems are more frequently  proposed as alternatives  to state-run  social security.
To qualify  as a viable alternative,  private social security requires  to provide  pension and social insurance
benefits  efficiently. But the design of an optimal  market structure and its competitive  nature is far from
trivial.  A private social security system comprises  workers (required to save funds for retirement and
acquire insurance  for covering invalidity  and survivorship  risks), pensioners, and two groups of private
providers (pension fund management companies  --  PFMCs  --  and insurance companies).  In addition.
strong and effective government regulation is required.  If governments already regulate voluntary
financial  transactions  in response  to externalities,  perverse incentives  and monopolistic  market structures
often  found in financial  markets, the rationale  for government  regulation  and supervision  is even stronger
for mandatory  retirement saving and invalidity/survivorship  insurance  where government  guarantees  on
savings and insurance  funds are significant  while serious conflicts of interests may arise between fund
' Previous  work on generational  accounting  methods  and applications  include  Auerbach,  Ghokale  and Kotlikoff
(1994),  Auerbach,  Ghokale,  Kotlikoff  and Steigum  (1993), Franco  et al. (1991), Gokhale, Kotlikoff  and Sabelhaus
(1994), and Kotlikoff  (1992).10
owners  and managers. 5 Chile's 13-year  experience  of a particular  private social security  system provides
various lessons.  A privatized mandatory pension system based on defined contributions saved in
individual  accounts protected by private property rights, like the Chilean system, appears to provide
protection against many sources of political and budgetary risk embedded in public defined-benefit
systems (Diamond 1994a).
Diamond  (1994b)  focuses in this issue on some worrying features  of the Chilean system. While
he underscores  the advantages in protecting social security from political interference and the indirect
benefit of deepening  the financial  sector, he raises tough questions  regarding  administrative  costs and the
low insurance  protection of defined-contribution  systems.  Reliance  on choice of PFMCs by individual
workers has contributed to  high  administrative and  sales costs in  Chile. 6 PFMCs have raised
significantly  their sales forces to attract new affiliations in response to competitive  pressures.  In order
to reduce excessive  sales costs, Diamond  suggests  to regulate the demand for private fund management
by forcing people to purchase  pension services on a group basis.  Another issue raised by Diamond is
the low insurance  protection  provided  by the Chilean system of defined contributions. The risks of the
length of working life, of arriving at retirement age with a long expected life, and of dying before
retirement  which cannot be translated  into higher consumption  in case of surviving, are all problems of
defined-contribution  plans which according to Diamond are better solved by defined-benefit  plans.
Not only private pension funds are subject to current inquiry.  Mitchell and associates have
researched  the behavior of public pension funds  covering state and local employees  in the United  States,
showing  that pension  funding and returns are linked  to fund board composition  and regulatory constraints
(Mitchell  and Smith, forthcoming;  Mitchell  and Hsin 1994). Hsin and Mitchell  (1994) provide  statistical
5  See Arrau, Valdes-Prieto  and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1993)  and Valdes-Prieto  (1994a)  for surveys  of alternative
market  structures  and private  fund  governance  arrangements.
6  See  Vald6s-Prieto  (1994c)  for a comparative  analysis  of administrative  costs  of the Chilean  pension  system
in an international  context.11
evidence  on the determinants  of actuarial assumptions  and contribution  rates in a sample  of 325 U.S. state
and local government plans in 1992.  They show that economic determinants  (such as unemployment
rates, unionization of plan participants, and pension plan reserves) and measures of pension plan
governance and  management practices (such as  the fraction  of  board  members elected by  plan
participants, plan issuance of financial reports, and frequency of independent  audits) have statistical
influence  on the plans' assumed interest rates, assumed spread rates, amortization periods, required
contributions,  and actual contributions. An implication  of the paper is that public pension funding may
become  more sensitive  to strategic  selection  of interest rates and other key assumptions  with rising fiscal
pressure and when they are managed  by participant-run  boards.
2.4  Regional and Country Experiences
Pension  systems  are and will be reformed  on a world-wide  scale. As social security  systems  and
reforms tend to share certain features  within regions, it is appropriate  to assess them at a regional level.
Due to the magnitude  of their pension system problem, their reform intensity, or their innovative  value
for future experiences,  we have chosen three developing  regions for selective surveys of social security
arrangements:  East Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America.
The survey by Ribe (1994) of pension systems in Indonesia, Malaysia,  Singapore, and Thailand
identifies  structural features and policy problems in these countries. 7 The four pension systems share
a basic feature: they are fully-funded  defined-contribution  schemes managed by centralized provident
funds with a heavy concentration of fund portfolios in public-sector  and housing mortgage liabilities.
However,  the degree of centralization  and labor force coverage  differs in the four countries, ranging  from
central  funds  for all workers in Malaysia  and Singapore  to decentralized  provident funds in Indonesia  and
7 Among  other  studies  of East  Asian  pension  systems  and reforms  are Shome  and Saito  (1979),  Kalijaran  and
Wiboonchutikula  (1986),  Lim  (1986),  Queisser  (1991),  Mesa-Lago  (1992),  Hirtz  (1992),  Tjabyi  (1993),  and  Vittas
(1993).12
Thailand,  and from comprehensive  coverage in Malaysia  to very little coverage in Thailand. Defined-
contribution  systems  in East Asia have avoided the labor market distortions  of PAYG schemes  but have
failed in providing  adequate  replacement  rates and, with the exception  of Singapore,  adequate  population
coverage.  The paper recommends  to diversify  portfolio investment  toward private sector liabilities (to
minimize  the risk of misuse of pension funds and raise the risk-return benefits to contributors)  and to
limit the frequent  demands for PAYG plans (motivated  by lower replacement  rates) to minimum-benefit
programs, complementing  existing funded defined-contribution  schemes which should continue to
dominate  pension systems.
In the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU) pension systems  are just
one of all economic  institutions  subject to deep systemic  change.  Post-socialist  transition provides the
opportunity  to reform pension systems in Eastern Europe and the FSU along the lines followed  today in
Latin America. However it seems that many of these countries are adopting state-run PAYG schemes
prevalent  in Western Europe, under the pressure to conform to European Union institutions  and foreign
advisors  .'
Holzmann  (1994) points out the main deficiencies  of pension systems in Eastern Europe and the
FSU, characterized  by low retirement ages and old populations,  high contributions  unrelated  to pension
benefits  causing  severe labor market distortions,  output  reductions  reflected  by increasing  pension  system
losses which burden fragile government  budgets, and ineffective  poverty alleviation  of poor pensioners.
The paper  recommends  pension reform  two proceed  on two tracks: (i) reforming  coverage  criteria, raising
retirement  ages, and revising  benefits  of the current PAYG  scheme,  and (ii) adopting  defined-contribution
fully-funded  privately-managed  systems. The design of pension  reform should allow for Pareto-efficient
transition  features and growth externalities  derived from full funding. Holzmann  concludes  that there is
8 Among  recent  studies  of pension  systems  and  reforms  in Eastern  Europe  and  the FSU  are Hobbs  et  al. (1991),
Diamond  (1992),  Jenidns  (1992),  Holzmann  (1993),  Fox  (1993),  Johnson  (1993),  and World  Bank  (1994).13
limited scope for  swapping existing  government  assets  for  the  huge implicit social  security  debt 9 --
hence transition deficits will require financing by other means  --  and suggests that financial sectors are
still insufficiently developed to provide the minimum conditions for starting  fully-funded schemes now.
State-run defined-benefit pension systems  in Latin America were  often started  as fully-funded
schemes but evolved  into de facto  PAYG  schemes  due  to  misuse of  fund reserves  during  their first
decades of existence.  The maturation of both pension systems and country populations has made apparent
the failures  of conventional state  PAYG schemes  in Latin America:  rising deficits  spilling  into fiscal
balances or leading to ever-increasing  payroll taxation and labor-market distortions and informalization;
perverse redistribution toward powerful interest groups while old-age poor remain insufficiently protected,
and underdeveloped capital markets.  These failures  of unreformed pension systems are largely similar
to those observed in Eastern Europe and the FSU, although the size of fiscal losses and market distortions
is smaller in Latin America due to its earlier  stages of demographic transition and system maturity,  as
well as lower population coverage.  However,  the weaknesses of conventional state PAYG systems  in
Latin America have led to an explosion of pension reforms,  started by Chile in 1981 and continued since
1991 by a host of other countries.'0
Uthoff (1994) diagnoses the features  of selected Latin American  economies  and their pension
9 A recent  study  for OECD  countries  (Van Den Noord and Herd 1993)  reports  calculations  of net implicit  public
pension  liabilities  (the present value of accrued pension rights as a ratio to 1990  GDP), which range from 113  %
in the U.S. to 259% in Italy.
0 On pension  systems  and reforms in Latin America  see Mesa-Lago  (1978, 1990, 1992, 1993), Mc Greevey
(1990),  Uthoff  and Szalachman  (1991, 1992, 1994),  and Fundaci6n  Friedrich  Ebert  de Colombia  (FESCOL)  (1992).
Among the country studies  are the following.  For Chile: Wallich (1983), Baeza and Manubens (1988), Cheyre
(1988),  Arrau (1991, 1992, 1994), Iglesias  and Acufia  (1991), Pihiera  (1991),  Marcel and Arenas (1992), Vittas and
Iglesias (1992), CIEDESS (1992), Gillion and Bonilla (1992), and Diamond and Valdes-Prieto  (1994).  For
Argentina:  Feldman  (1992), Schulthess  and Demarco (1993), and Bour  and Urbiztondo  (1994). For Colombia:  C.
L6pez (1992), H. L6pez (1992), Contralorfa  General de la Repiublica  (1992), Ocampo (1992), Ramirez (1992),
Zuleta (1992), Lora, Zuleta and Helmsdorff  (1993), and Ministerio  de Trabajo y Seguridad  Social de Colombia
(1993). For Brazil: Schymura  (1992), Faro (1993), M6dici,  Oliveira  and Beltrao (1993), Williamson  and Pampel
(1993, ch. 7).  For Peru: Canales-Kriljenko  (1991, 1992)  and Marcos Rueda (1992).  For Paraguay: Arrau and
Bitran (1992). For Mexico: Arrau (1990).14
systems, and presents a comparative evaluation of the  1981 Chilean pension reform and the reform
projects started in Argentina and Colombia  during 1994.  There are strong common elements in these
reforms, reflected  by two co-existing  pension system components:  a FF defined-contribution  pillar based
on individual  accounts, typically  managed  by the private sector, and a complementary  distributive  pillar
financed and run  by the government.  Uthoff concludes that these features address many of the
shortcomings of pre-reform state PAYG schemes by  promoting: isolation of pension funds from
demographic  and system maturation  trends, deepening of emerging capital markets, protection of the
fully-funded  privately-managed  pillar from political pressures by separating  it from the state-run pillar,
and reaping efficiency  gains in pension fund administration  and investment.
At the other end of the spectrum of pension reform in Latin America are many countries, like
Brazil, where the discussion  of alternative  reform proposals is just starting. Two reform proposals for
Brazil's pension system are included in this issue.  While they share a common diagnose of the
shortcomings  of Brazil's current state PAYG scheme, their prescriptions  differ.
Carvalho  and de Faro (1994)  make a radical reform proposal for Brazil, inspired  by the Chilean
experience, which combines  raising retirement ages to 65 years and substituting  a FF system based on
individual  accounts for the current PAYG scheme.  The paper develops  an actuarial estimation  of the
corresponding  reform  transition  deficit,  abstracting  from general-equilibrium  feedback  effects  arising  from
reform-induced  changes  in wages, real interest rates and output levels. Estimates  of the reform deficits
start at 5.3% of GDP for the first year of the reform, falling gradually  to 2.5% of GDP in the 10th  year
and to 1% of GDP and below in the 30th year and beyond."  Due to the significant  reduction in pension
benefits  of the old system as a result of higher retirement ages, the authors estimate that these moderate
transition deficits could be  paid by  maintaining current  employer contributions (while employee
" These  figures  are similar  to Chile's  pension  reform  transition  deficits,  which  staited  at 3.2  %  of GDP  in 1982,
reached  a peak  of 4.8  % of GDP  in 1992,  after  which  they  are  projected  to decline  gradually,  reaching  1.5  %  of GDP
in 2015 (Arrau 1992).15
contributions  are channeled  to the new FF system), phasing them out in tandem with declining  deficits.
Fragelli, de Magalhaes, Portocarrero, and Schymura (1994) underscore that Brazil's current
PAYG  system remained  roughly balanced  in the 1980s  as a result of high inflation. Their proposal for
pension reform also raises retirement ages (to a range of 60-65 years) but differs from the preceding
Chilean-type  reform  proposal  by suggesting  substitution  of Brazil's current system  by a scheme  comprised
by four pension  pillars.  The mixed system would include a first tier of a minimum-pension  benefit paid
universally  and financed by general taxation, a second defined-benefit  state-run  PAYG tier financed by
mandatory  contributions  from all workers, a third defined-contribution  privately-run  FF tier financed  by
mandatory  contributions  from all workers, and a final tier of voluntary  complementary  retirement  savings
accounts  favored by tax deductions. The rationale  for the second PAYG  pillar  --  which is absent  from
the preceding reform proposal  --  is that it allows to reduce the fiscal cost of the transition, at the cost
of preserving  a partial PAYG scheme.
3.  REMAINING  ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  AND POLICY DESIGN
After introducing  the contributions  published  in this issue, we raise now 15 remaining  research
and policy  design issues  which still have not been addressed  conclusively  by these papers or the existing
literature on pension systems and reforms.
3.1  Factor Markets. Growth. Intergenerational  Welfare. and Mandatorv  Saving
I . It is often  argued that a PAYG  system inhibits  the deepening  of financial  and capital markets  (and
the development  of appropriate financial regulation) which would be observed when pension funds
demanding  long-term debt instruments were allowed to operate in a FF  scheme.  There is tentative
evidence  linking Chile's  13-year  experience with a growing FF and privately-managed  system to its
financial  development,  private saving  surge, improved  financial  regulation,  and high growth (Corsetti  and16
Schmidt-Hebbel  1994). But more systematic  evidence in support of this notion is still lacking.
2.  The well-known labor-market distortion associated to PAYG contributions in the one-sector
exogenous-growth  DAK model leads to a reduction in output and welfare levels. Corsetti (1994) shows
that potentially  much more significant  growth losses  arise when taking account  of the incentives  provided
by PAYG  taxation  to shift employment  and production from formal to informal sectors in an economy
with endogenous  growth.  A natural extension of this work is to allow for varying both the sectoral
composition  and the aggregate level of employment  and to test for the empirical weight of employment
shifts relative to overall employment  reductions  as a result of PAYG taxes.
3.  While we know the qualitative  long-term  effects of pension reform, we still do not know much
about their size.  Conventional  exogenous-growth  DAK models show little long-run effects of PAYG
systems  and PAYG-FF reforms.  Auerbach  and Kotlikoff  (1987)  estimate that introducing  PAYG  in the
U.S. reduces stationary GDP by 5% and Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1993)  estimate that a fully taxed-
financed  PAYG-FF  reform raises stationary  GDP by 3-5% in representative  closed  economies. Cifuentes
and Valdes-Prieto  (1994) estimate that the long-term GDP increase caused by a mostly tax-financed
reform in a representative  closed economy  ranges from 5% without  credit constraints  to 16% with credit
constraints. While the latter result is a clear indication  of how important  it is to lift certain restrictive
assumptions  (in this case the absence of credit constraints), we are still far from realistic estimates  of
short and long-term  macroeconomic  effects of pension reform, taking into account accurately the extent
of bequests,  myopia,  credit constraints,  uncertainty,  financial  openness,  and endogenous  growth response
in real-world  economies.
4.  While most reform simulation  results based on exogenous-growth  studies show little steady-state
effects of a PAYG-FF pension reform, they report massive intergenerational  welfare redistributions
among cohorts during the first decades after the pension reform is started.  These intergenerational
redistributions  are very sensitive to life lengths, dependency  ratios, and the way transition deficits are17
financed --  and, most of all, to the lack of offsetting  voluntary intergenerational  transfers in standard
OLG models. Therefore the question  arises about the empirical relevance  of the OLG model compared
to the representative-consumer  or  optimal-growth  model  --  the two "distinct dialects of the broad
language  we call 'neoclassical  growth theory"' (Azariadis 1993, p. xiii) --  in assessing  macroeconomic
and distributional  consequences  of pension reform.
5.  Is a mandatory  FF pension system an optimal long-term arrangement  or should it be outphased
once its main objectives  have been achieved? Two possible benefits of mandatory  FF in comparison  to
both mandatory  PAYG and voluntary  saving systems are that the former could make people more aware
of the need to save for retirement (reducing the extent of myopia) and contribute to capital market
deepening and the removal of market imperfections (possibly reducing the incidence of borrowing
constraints, informational  deficiencies,  and moral hazard).  However, among  the costs of a mandatory
FF scheme in comparison  to a voluntary  scheme are the government  guarantees on mandatory pension
funds and the welfare reduction  of those groups which are forced to save in excess of what they would
save voluntarily. A comparison  of FF costs and benefits  raises the issue of the optimal  size of FF saving
and its gradual downsizing  over time toward a level of mandatory  saving required to finance a socially-
acceptable  minimum  pension.
3.2  Intragenerational  Distribution. Poverty, the Role of Government.  and Political Economy
6.  For economists  it comes natural  to advocate  direct programs  targeted  at the old-age  poor, financed
by general taxation, to embody  the distributive  function of a pension system. However, in practice it is
often hard to separate the distributive function from the dominating  pension pillar, for reasons which
include  political  constraints  to the reform, administrative  costs and stigma  effects of targeting  effectively
the poor through means testing, and fiscal constraints  to raise general tax revenue to finance a separate
minimum-pension  program. The proposals  by Ribe (1994) for East Asian countries and Fragelli et al.18
(1994) for Brazil include a small-scale  distributive PAYG pillar to cover minimum pension benefits.
complementing  a dominating FF system, while Valdes-Prieto (1994b) argues against this alternative.
These divergent positions reflect how far we still are far from reaching a consensus  on this important
design issue.
7.  Other distributive  issues  arise within a private FF system. In the Chilean system (as opposed  to
the Colombian  case), contributors  are charged  both a variable and a fixed commission  by PFMCs.  Such
a structure  can reflect efficiently  the costs of individual  account  management  and portfolio investment  but
the fixed commission  has a regressive impact on the poor.  Should the government subsidy the fixed
commission,  financing the subsidy by using general tax revenue? Another group affected  by replacing
a PAYG system by a FF system are women who loose the subsidy  they enjoy in PAYG systems  due to
their longer life expectancy.
8.  Zurita (1994) initiates  a promising line of research on an important  design issue: governments
should know the cost of the minimum-pension  insurance they extend to workers, especially  when this
benefit is financed by general tax revenue. He has shown that it is important  to consider the volatility
of asset returns in addressing this question correctly.  Future research based on this framework is
important  to quantify the cost of these contingent liabilities incurred by governments as part of their
pension system reforms.
9.  A reform which substitutes  a privately-managed  FF system  for a state-run  PAYG  scheme implies
reform losers  and winners. The big losers are the initial  state social-security  institutions  which are phased
out (as in Chile) or reduced in size (as in Colombia), while the big winner is the private sector.  Not
surprisingly,  state pension funds often tend to oppose social security reform in Latin America.  In the
meantime,  the private sectors  --  keen to win significant  shares in the new market of PFMCs early on
--  lobby  governments  hard to accelerate  reforms and approval of private PFMCs. Should management
and workers of losing state social security institutions be coopted through early retirement or other19
subsidy  schemes'? While this political-economy  question  has hardly a general response, it requires to be
addressed  by any country launching  a pension reform.
3.3  Private Pension Funds: Consumer Selection. Insurance, Portfolio Composition. and Starting-Up
Conditions
10.  Consumer  selection  of PFMCs can be taken: (a) by the government  on behalf of individuals  (as
in state-run PAYG  schemes or by forcing affiliation to a single fully-funded  pension fund as proposed
by Kotlikoff  1994, this issue, for Bolivia);  (b) on a strictly individual  basis (as in Chile): or (c) through
a close representative, such as the employer (as in  Switzerland), the union (as in Australia) or an
employee of the county of residence (to represent independent and small-firm workers).  Effective
consumer choice  is  typically broadened (either  at  the  individual level  or  delegated to  a  close
representative)  when a competitive  privately-managed  system is introduced  in order to put the necessary
competitive  pressures on private providers.  Is delegation to a representative superior to individual
choice'?  Diamond (1994b) and  Arrau,  Valdes-Prieto and  Schmidt-Hebbel  (1993) argue that the
international  experience, with delegated choice in Australia and Switzerland, and individual  consumer
choice in Chile, strongly favors the former alternative.  Substantial  economies of scale in contracting
providers  and lower marketing  costs seem to justify delegated  consumer  choice. However, the challenge
is to design a collective  contracting arrangement  that promotes competition  by fund managers without
introducing  principal-agent  problems  between  the representative  and the workers.
11.  Something similar happens when a worker reaches retirement and decides between buying a
pension annuity or a programmed (or lump-sum)  withdrawal.  Chile's experience suggests that this
decision  is costly to workers, as reflected  by high brokerage fees and low implicit interest rates paid by
insurance  companies. Among  alternative  institutional  arrangements  is a centralized  auctioning  mechanism
that would replace  brokers and force insurance  companies  to compete more strongly to provide pension20
services.
12.  A closely  related  design issue raised by Kotlikoff  (1994) is how pension  benefits should  be made.
Should the pension system make lump-sum  distributions (or allow for programmed withdrawals) or,
alternatively,  should it provide pension annuities? While the latter option hedges the risk of the date of
death, it implies  higher old-age consumption,  smaller bequests, and a lower demand for children, hence
leading  to lower national  saving and fertility.
13.  Another design issue is related  to Diamond's  (1994b)  concern about  the low insurance  protection
provided  by defined-contribution  systems  to older workers. In fact, when a worker is close to retirement
his pension wealth is at great risk because it is invested in a portfolio exposed to strong short-term
fluctuations. In order to hedge against  this risk, options along  the line of defined-benefit  programs could
be considered  for workers close to retirement.  For instance, PFMCs could be required to offer (or
contract out in the marketplace)  pension floors three to five years before retirement age.  On the other
hand, lump-sum  or programmed withdrawal has the potential moral-hazard  effect of over-consumption
by pensioners  supported  by the government's minimum  pension floor.
14.  International  diversification  of pension fund portfolios is desirable because it allows pensioners
to improve  their portfolio  risks and returns. Investing  abroad  also precludes  pension funds (and PFMCs)
from acquiring excessive market power in  local capital markets.  However, international portfolio
diversification  comes at the potential cost of higher international  financial  volatility (including  sharpened
equity price and exchange rate fluctuations  in response  to rapid international  portfolio reallocations)  and
loss of monetary  policy  autonomy  (Davis 1994, Fontaine 1994,  Reisen  and Williamson  1994). This issue
is particularly  relevant  for fully-funded  private pension systems in small countries (like Bolivia)  where
the risk-return  gains from investing  abroad are huge relative  to those in larger countries  and in medium-
sized economies (like Chile) where outstanding  pension assets have reached large shares of domestic
equity or GDP. Kotlikoff's  (1994) proposal  for Bolivia  favors complete  international  risk diversification21
by instructing simply the Bolivian pension fund to hold the world portfolio.  The need to strike a balance
between the microeconomic benefits of open capital accounts and its macroeconomic costs  is urgent for
the growing number of countries regaining access to foreign capital flows and starting privately-managed
funded pension systems.
15.  Which financial and capital-market requirements should be met before a privately-managed  FF
scheme can be started?  One view on this is to wait until domestic financial and capital markets are fully
developed and effective government regulation and supervision of banking, insurance,  equity, and bonds
markets are in place,  in order to minimize the risk of pension reform failure.  An alternative view is that
only a minimum set of financial markets  --  banks and a primary  market for government  debt  --  is
required  at the start  of a  private  FF system.'2 Further  development  of financial  instruments,  capital
markets and adequate regulatory and supervisory institutions would be an endogenous consequence of the
growth of private pension funds.  This  issue is of central  importance to Eastern  Europe  and the FSU,
where property rights are still being defined, banks are burdened by large bad debts,  and capital markets
are almost  non-existent.  The  great  challenge  faced  by  pension  reformers  in that  region  is to  put a
minimum set of legal and market conditions  into place without forfeiting the opportunity of introducing
a privately-managed FF pension system.  However,  "what the minimum conditions for the financial sector
are and how they can be introduced  rapidly is still open for discussion" (Holzmann  1994).
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